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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: An Equal Protection Challenge to Court-
imposed Remedial Hiring Quotas
In United States v. Paradise,' the United States Supreme Court held that a
court-ordered one-black-for-one-white promotion quota, when it was im-
posed to remedy a long history of racial discrimination by a state, did not
violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The con-
troversy began in 1972 when the NAACP brought suit against the Alabama
Department of Public Safety to enjoin the Department's racially
discriminatory hiring practices. These practices had served to completely ex-
clude blacks from employment by the Department. The district court found
the Department in violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment and ordered affirmative relief.2 The subsequent history of this
litigation provides the justification for the Supreme Court's holding. Conse-
quently, a full discussion of this history is necessary to the understanding of
the case.
The Department had engaged in various practices designed to frustrate the
relief ordered by the district court. 3 These practices brought the parties back
into court several times in the eleven years prior to the order that brought the
parties before the Supreme Court. The order appealed from was a result of
the Department's failure to meet the terms of a consent decree that had been
approved by the district court in 1981.1 In that decree, the Department
agreed to develop a promotion procedure that would not have an adverse ef-
fect on the promotion opportunities of black troopers.
In 1983 the Department had an immediate need to promote fifteen
troopers to the rank of corporal but had failed to provide an acceptable pro-
motion scheme. A promotion from its existing list of eligible candidates
1. 55 U.S.L.W. 4211 (U.S. Feb. 25, 1987). The named parties both entered the case as in-
terveners.
2. The relief included a 50 percent hiring quota for black employees until their representa-
tion on the state trooper force equaled their proportional representation in Alabama's popula-
tion (25 percent). The Department was also ordered to develop nondiscriminatory personnel
policies dealing with promotions, recruitment, testing, and training.
3. These practices included the institution of a hiring freeze to avoid the hiring goals set by
the court, discriminatory treatment of blacks at the training academy, failure to promote blacks
to higher ranks once they were hired, development of promotion standards that had an adverse
impact on promotion opportunities for blacks, and delays in complying with the terms of con-
sent decrees which had been approved by the court.
4. The 1981 consent decree was the second one dealing with the Department's promotion
practices. It was an affirmation of the terms of a 1979 consent decree the Department had failed
to honor.
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would have excluded all blacks from advancement.' In light of the Depart-
ment's immediate need for officers and its failure to provide a non-
discriminatory promotion policy, the court ordered the corporal positions to
be filled by eight black and eight white officers.6
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court. Justice Bren-
nan announced the judgment of the Court in a plurality opinion joined by
three other Justices. 7 The Court recognized that a heightened level of scrutiny
applied to a court-ordered race-conscious remedy for racial discrimination.
However, the Court deferred the determination of the appropriate standard
because the current remedy survived even strict scrutiny. The relief was "nar-
rowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest." '
The order of the district court served a compelling public interest for two
reasons. First, the government had a compelling interest in remedying
discrimination by a state actor. The Department's history of completely ex-
cluding blacks from employment prior to the 1972 lawsuit and its failure to
cooperate in the eradication of this discrimination created a need for affir-
mative action by the court.9 The absence of blacks from the upper ranks of
the force was a direct result of the Department's past discriminatory prac-
tices. Consequently, the government had an interest in providing a remedy
for the disparity in the upper ranks of the force in addition to the entry-level
positions.
Second, the remedial action of the district court was also supported by the
government's compelling interest in compliance with the judgments of its
courts. The Department's history of frustrating the purposes of the district
court's order justified action that would ensure such compliance. 0
The strict scrutiny analysis applied by the Court also demanded a "nar-
rowly tailored" remedy. The Department's recalcitrance created the need for
an easily enforced objective remedy. The quota provided such a remedy. The
limited nature of the order also supported the Court's decision. The order re-
quired promotion of black officers only if they were qualified. It remained in
effect only until the Department provided an acceptable promotion scheme
of its own. This convinced the Court that the order was no greater in scope
5. The court rejected the Department's offer to fill four of the fifteen positions with blacks,
finding the one-to-one ratio necessary to overcome the present effects of the Department's past
discriminatory practices.
6. The Court also ordered that promotions to higher ranks within the force follow the same
proportions. The order was limited in both time and effect. It would only apply if black officers
were qualified for the promotions, and it would remain in force only until the Department
presented an acceptable promotion procedure to the court.
7. Justice Marshall, Justice Blackmun, and Justice Powell joined Justice Brennan's opi-
nion. Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment. Justice O'Connor filed a dissenting opinion
that was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia. Justice White filed a separate
dissenting statement.
8. Paradise, 55 U.S.L.W. at 4216 (quoting the opinion of Powell, J., in Wygant v. Jackson
Bd. of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842, 1846 (1986)).
9. Id.




than was required to remedy the Department's failure to comply with its
prior obligations.
This case follows the reasoning of another recent Supreme Court affirma-
tive action decision, Sheet Metal Workers Association, Local 28 v. EEOC.II
Sheet Metal Workers upheld a hiring quota in a Title VII case. The quota
was imposed on the union only after the union's disregard of previous court
orders to pursue nondiscriminatory hiring policies had risen to the level of
contempt of court. The union's obstinance convinced the Court that the im-
position of a hiring quota was the only way to ensure compliance with the
judgment of the court.
Paradise could have been distinguished from Sheet Metal Workers. The
Supreme Court seemingly has been more willing to tolerate race-conscious
relief under Title VII than under the fourteenth amendment.
The Court allowed a private employer to voluntarily institute a racial
quota for admission to a training program in Steelworkers v. Weber.' 2 In
that case the employer was instituting an affirmative action program to
alleviate the effects of a previously segregated workplace. The effects of this
prior discrimination could arguably have subjected the employer to suit
under Title VII. The remedial nature of the affirmative action plan justified
its race-consciousness.
However, a similar attempt to alleviate racial disparity in the work force
was found to be a violation of equal protection in Wygant v. Jackson Board
of Education.3 In Wygant a collective bargaining agreement with the
teachers union called for a separate seniority list for teachers hired under the
Board's affirmative action plan. This would have protected the job security
of the minority teachers. The Supreme Court found the plan a violation of
the fourteenth amendment because it interfered with the vested seniority
rights of innocent nonminority teachers. Since there had been no official
finding of past discrimination by the school board, the nonminority teachers
could not be presumed to be the beneficiaries of past discrimination.
Paradise and Sheet Metal Workers can both be distinguished from the
above case. The Court-ordered remedies in Paradise and Sheet Metal
Workers were in response to proven racial discrimination. As such, the race-
based relief was not an attempt by private parties to deal with imagined or
presumed illegality. Instead, these remedies were ordered by the federal courts.
The courts are charged with the duty of interpreting and applying the law.
Consequently, the courts are more qualified to determine if the existence of
racial imbalance in the work force is a violation of either the fourteenth amend-
ment or Title VII.
The decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Paradise and Sheet
Metal Workers have created a narrow class of cases in which racial quotas
may be used. These cases involve not only proven discrimination but also re-
11. 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986).
12. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
13. 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986).
1987]
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quire a failure of less restrictive remedies. When an employer has been found
guilty of racial discrimination and has failed to remove racial barriers, the
barriers will be removed by the courts.
CIVIL RIGHrTS: Housing Discrimination
In California Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Guerra,I a federally
chartered savings and loan association brought an action for a declaration
that section 12945(b)(2) of California's Fair Employment and Housing Act
(FEHA)2 is inconsistent with and preempted by Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act.3 The association was also seeking an injunction against its en-
forcement. The FEHA is a comprehensive statute that prohibits discrimina-
tion in employment and housing.
The provision of the statute at issue applies to employers who are subject
to Title VII and requires these employers to provide female employees an un-
paid pregnancy disability leave of up to four months. This section has been
interpreted by California's Fair Employment and Housing Commission to re-
quire that employers reinstate an employee returning from a pregnancy leave
to the job she previously held, unless that job is no longer available because
of business necessity.'
The action arose when California Federal Savings & Loan Association's
leave policy was challenged. This leave policy permits an employee with three
months of service to take unpaid leaves for reasons which, among others, in-
clude disability and pregnancy. Although an attempt is made to return an
employee to a similar position, the association reserves the right to terminate
an employee when no similar position is available upon the employee's
return. A qualified female employee took pregnancy leave in January 1982.
Upon notification of her desire to return in April, the association advised
that her job had been filled and no similar positions were available. She filed
a complaint with the Fair Employment and Housing Commission, but the
association brought this declaratory action prior to the hearing before the
commission.
The association argued that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978
(PDA),5 which specifies that sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII in-
cludes discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, preempts the state statute.
The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed. The Court recognized that a federal
statute may preempt a state statute in one of three ways.6 First, Congress
may expressly provide that state law is preempted by the federal statute. Sec-
ond, congressional intent to preempt may be inferred from a comprehensive
regulatory scheme that leaves no room for supplementary state regulation.
1. 107 S. Ct. 683 (1987).
2. CAL. GOV'x CODE §§ 12900-12996 (West 1980 and Supp. 1987).
3. 42 U.S.C. f.§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982).
4. 107 S. Ct. at 687.
5. 42 U.S.C. . 2000e(k) (1982).




Third, a state statute is preempted by a federal statute when a conflict exists
that makes compliance with both impossible. In this case the Court found
that the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which encompasses the PDA, expressly pro-
vides that state laws be preempted only if they conflict with federal law.
7
Therefore, in order to determine whether Title VII, as amended by the PDA,
preempts a state statute requiring employers to provide leave and reinstate-
ment to employees disabled by pregnancy, the Court first examined whether
the two statutes were in conflict.
The association argued that the PDA prohibits an employer from giving
the preferential treatment to pregnant employees required by the California
statute. However, the Court found that, in passing the PDA, Congress in-
tended to overcome past discrimination based on pregnancy, not prohibit
preferential treatment. In other words, Congress intended the PDA to pro-
vide a floor for pregnancy disability benefits, rather than a ceiling. California
employers are not required to preferentially treat pregnancy disability and are
free to give comparable protection to other disabilities. The Court held,
therefore, that the California statute is not preempted by Title VII, as
amended by the PDA, because it is not inconsistent with the purposes of the
federal statute and does not require an act that is unlawful under Title VII.
8
This holding means that states may choose to impose minimum require-
ments for pregnancy disability that result in preferential treatment of preg-
nant women provided the statute does not prohibit the employer from in-
stituting comparable benefits for employees disabled for other reasons.
CIVIL RIGHTS: School Board of Nassua County v. Arline
Gene Arline was hospitalized in 1957 for tuberculosis. When the disease
became inactive, she became an elementary schoolteacher. She taught over the
next twenty years. In the years 1977 and 1978, she had a relapse and was
suspended from teaching. She was discharged at the end of the 1978-79
school year because of the continued recurrence of the disease.
After being denied administrative relief, she brought suit in federal district
court alleging a violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.'
The district court found that Ms. Arline did not meet the definition of a
7. Id.
8. Id. at 693-94.
1. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982). The section provides, inter alia, that no "otherwise qualified
handicapped individual," as defined in 29 U.S.C. § 706(7) (1982) shall, solely by reason of his
handicap, be excluded from participation in any program receiving federal financial assistance."
Id.
29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982) defines "handicapped individual" as "any person who (i) has a
physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life
activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impair-
ment." Department of Health and Human Services regulations define "physical impairment" to
mean, inter alia, any physiological disorder affecting the respiratory system and defines "major
life activities" to include working.
19871
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handicapped person under the statute. In the alternative, the court found
that she was not "qualified" to teach school. The court of appeals reversed
and held that a contagious disease qualifies as a handicap within the meaning
of the statute. The court remanded for further findings of fact as to whether
the respondent was "otherwise qualified" as a teacher.2
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed and held that a person with the conta-
gious disease of tuberculosis may be considered a handicapped person within
the meaning of section 504.1 The case was remanded for a finding of whether
Arline was "otherwise qualified" as a teacher. The Court found that Arline
met the definition of a handicapped person that had been expanded by a
1974 amendment.4 The definition was expanded to deter "discrimination
against '[a] person who has a record of, or is regarded as having, an impair-
ment [but who] may at present have no actual incapacity at all'." '5
Arline's tuberculosis established a record of impairment and qualified her
as a handicapped individual within the meaning of the statute. In the dissent,
Justices Rehnquist and Scalia argued that the Court extended the definition
of a handicap beyond the plain meaning of the statute and that a condition
imposed on federal funds must be expressed unambiguously. 6
The petitioner claimed that Arline was discharged not because of her hand-
icap but because of the health threat to others. The Court refused to allow a
handicap in. the nature of a contagious disease to be distinguished from other
handicaps because it would allow the employer to use the distinction to
justify discriminatory treatment. The contagious disease and the handicap
are the same condition and should not be considered separately.' A different
interpretation would allow the label "contagious" to be sufficient grounds to
terminate one's employment. If this were allowed, a determination in light of
medical evidence would never be made. By considering such a disease a hand-
icap, the Court forces employers to evaluate the condition with objective
medical evidence. A contagious disease should not remove a person from the
protection of section 504. If, however, the condition does pose a severe
threat to others, the employee would not be considered "otherwise
qualified" and may be terminated.
In considering whether a person is otherwise qualified, a court should con-
sider:
(1) the nature of the risk (how the disease is transmitted), (2) the
duration of the risk (how long is the carrier infectious), (3) the
severity of the risk (what is the potential harm to third parties)
2. School Bd. of Nassua County v. Arline, 772 F.2d 759, 764-65 (1 1th Cir. 1985).
3. Arline, 107 S. Ct. 1123 (1987).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982). See supra note 1 for text of section 706(7)(B).
5. Arline, 107 S. Ct. at 1126-27 (quoting Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442
U.S. 397, 405-06 n.6 (1979)).
6. Id. at 1132.
7. Id. at 1130.
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and (4) the probabilities the disease will be transmitted and cause
varying degrees of harm.8
The Court did not state absolutely that every contagious disease is a handi-
cap. Indeed, the Court distinguished the present case from a case that may
concern an AIDS (Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome) victim.9 With its
holding the Court merely places a higher burden on the employer who wishes
to terminate a handicapped employee. This is the type of protection that the
Rehabilitation Act was designed to provide.
COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS: A Bank's Right to Stop Payment
on a Cashier's Check
A cashier's check is a bill of exchange' drawn by a bank upon itself.2
When a cashier's check is issued, the bank sells the check to the customer.
3
The customer, referred to as the purchaser or remitter, then negotiates the
check to a third party, who presents the check to the issuing bank for pay-
ment.
A cashier's check is a negotiable instrument,4 and, therefore, its legal
status is governed by articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC).s Although courts recognize the important commercial purpose of the
cashier's check, 6 not all agree on the legal significance or consequences of the
cashier's check under the UCC. Generally, courts are reluctant to allow
banks to stop payment on a cashier's check. Courts take this position
8. Id. at 1131 (quoting Brief for American Medical Association as American Curiae at 19).
9. Id. at 1128 n.7.
1. A bill of exchange is a three-party instrument in which the first party draws an order for
the payment of a sum certain on a second party for payment to a third party at a definite time in
the future. A bill of exchange is the same as a "draft" under the U.C.C. § 3-104(2)(a)(1982).
2. J. REITMAN, H. WEISBLATT, W. SCHLICHTING, T. RICE & J. COOPER, BANKING LAW §
133.10 (184) [hereinafter cited as S. REITMAN].
3. Cashier's checks are sold by a bank to a customer or purchaser. The purchaser's name
does not generally appear on the instrument unless the customer is named as a payee. The bank
will always insert the name of a specified payee on a cashier's check before its issuance and
delivery to the purchaser. J. REITMAN, supra note 2, at § 133.10(1).
4. A negotiable instrument is a writing signed by the drawer that contains an unconditional
promise or order to pay a sum certain in money at a definite time, or on demand, and is payable
to order or to bearer. U.C.C. § 3-104 (1982).
5. Valley Bank & Trust v. Zion's First Nat'l Bank, 656 P.2d 425 (Utah 1982). Although ar-
ticles 3 and 4 apply, there is no explicit reference to a cashier's check in the UCC. See Lawrence,
Making Cashier's Checks and Other Bank Checks Cost-Effective: A Plea for Revision of Ar-
ticles III and IV of UCC, 64 MINN. L. REv. 275 (1980). Articles 3 and 4 of the UCC have been
adopted in Oklahoma and can be found at 12A OKLA. STAT. §§ 3-101 to 4-504 (1981).
6. Kaufman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 370 F. Supp. 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Able & Assocs.
v. Orchard Hill Farms, 77 Il1. App. 3d 375, 395 N.E.2d 1138 (1979); National Newark & Essex
Bank v. Giordano, 111 N.J. Super. 347, 268 A.2d 327 (1970).
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because forcing a bank to honor all cashier's checks serves a public policy of
favoring the ready acceptance of cashier's checks in the marketplace.7
The Oklahoma Court of Appeals has recently had an opportunity to ad-
dress the issue of stop payment orders on a cashier's check in New Covenant
Community Church v. Federal National Bank & Trust Co. In New Cove-
nant, the defendant, Federal National Bank, issued a cashier's check on June
30, 1982. in the amount of $325,000 to the New Covenant Church and Living
Way Church, as payees. Living Way negotiated the cashier's check to the
New Covenant Church. On July 1, 1982, the New Covenant Church
deposited the check in its account at Penn Square Bank in Oklahoma City.
Upon learning of Penn Square's demise on July 2, 1982, both New Covenant
Church and Living Way demanded that Federal National Bank stop payment
on the cashier's check. The bank informed them it could not stop payment.
When the check was presented to the bank for payment, the bank honored
the check.
In its suit against the bank for actual and punitive damages, the New
Covenant Church contended that as the owner of the check, it had the right
to order the manner of payment. Additionally, the church argued that it
maintained the right, as principal, to revoke its agent's authority to collect
the item on its behalf. The church further asserted that when the bank paid
the cashier's check contrary to the order of its owner (the church), the bank
breached its contractual obligations under UCC section 3-413(1) 9 and con-
verted the church's property under UCC section 3-419(1).1" Further, the
church contended that UCC section 4-403," relied upon by the bank, is inap-
7. In general, see Lawrence, supra note 5, where the author suggests that the UCC should
be amended :o Eccommodate the appropriate role of cashier's checks and certified checks so that
there are no defenses against those instruments other than forgery and alteration. It is contended
that businessmen plan commercial transactions with specificity and care. Therefore, it is impor-
tant that rules are certain in this area and that the bargained-for allocation of risk will be
respected by the courts. If the rule were otherwise, however, expectations should conform so
that there would be uniformity and certainty. As such, bank checks would still obviate the risk
of dishonor associated with personal checks.
8. 734 P.2d 1318 (Okla. Ct. App. 1987).
9. U.C.C. 3-413(1) states: "(1) The maker or acceptor engages that he will pay the instru-
ment according to its tenor at the time of his engagement or as completed pursuant to Section
3-115 on incomalete instruments."
10. U.C.C. § 3-419(l) states:
(1) An instrument is converted when
(a) a drawee to whom it is delivered for acceptance refuses to return
it on demand; or
(b) any person to whom it is delivered for payment refuses on de-
mand either to pay or to return it; or
(c) it is paid on a forged indorsement.
11. U.C.C. § 4-403 states:
(1) A customer may by order to his bank stop payment of any item payable for
his account but the order must be received at such time and in such manner as to
afford the bank a reasonable opportunity to act on it prior to any action by the




plicable as it applies only where a bank customer, with an account at the
bank, writes a personal check payable on said account.
Relying on the principle announced in Yukon National Bank v. Modern
Builders Supply, Inc.,12 the Oklahoma Court of Appeals summarily dis-
missed the church's arguments, stating that as a general rule, neither a bank
nor a bank's customer may order a stop payment on a cashier's check." The
court reasoned that the drawee bank's signed engagement to honor the draft
was contemporaneous with its act of issuing the check. Thus, any stop pay-
ment order from the church that came after the date of issuance came after
the check was accepted and violated the provisions of section 4-303(1)(a)."4
It is submitted that New Covenant, as well as Yukon, miss the real issue.
Even if a cashier's check may be deemed accepted on issuance, section 3-418
of the UCC establishes that acceptance is only final in favor of a party who is
a holder in due course or one who in good faith has changed his position in
reliance on payment." The question then is not whether the bank has the
authority to stop payment on the cashier's check, but whether the bank has a
legal defense to liability on the check.' 6 By issuing the check, the bank is
primarily liable on the instrument as drawer even if not acceptor. Therefore,
the purchaser or holder of the check never had a right to stop payment
because it is not the purchaser's check. Where the bank denies liability,
however, because it has a legal defense to liability on the check, the issue to
(2) An oral order is binding upon the bank only for fourteen calendar days
unless confirmed in writing within that period. A written order is effective for only
six months unless renewed in writing.
(3) The burden of establishing the fact and amount of loss resulting from the
payment of an item contrary to a binding stop payment order is on the customer.
12. 686 P.2d 307 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984). This opinion of the Oklahoma Court of Appeals
has been specifically authorized by the Oklahoma Supreme Court for publication and therefore
is to be accorded precedential value.
13. New Covenant Community Church, 734 P.2d at 1320.
14. U.C.C. § 4-303(l)(a) provides:
(1) Any knowledge, notice or stop-order received by, legal process served upon or
setoff exercised by a payor bank, whether or not effective under other rules of law
to terminate, suspend or modify the bank's right or duty to pay an item or to
charge its customer's account for the item, comes too late to so terminate, suspend
or modify such right or duty if the knowledge, notice, stop-order or legal process is
received or served and a reasonable time for the bank to act thereon expires or the
setoff is exercised after the bank has done any of the following:
(a) accepted or certified the item;
(emphasis added).
15. U.C.C. § 3-418 (1982).
16. Wertz v. Richardson Heights Bank & Trust, 495 S.W.2d 572, 575-76 (Tex. 1973)
(dissent). See also Benson, Stop Payment of Cashier's Checks and Bank Drafts Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 2 Ofo N.U.L. REv. 445, 449 (1975):
The greatest danger of using stop payment language when dealing with cashier's
checks is that courts will interpret the rule that payment cannot be stopped as re-
quiring a court to grant summary judgment against a bank in all cases without an
inquiry into the status of the holder or the claims of the purchaser of the cashier's
check.
1987]
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be decided is whether the asserted defense is good under sections 3-305 or
3-306.17
The better reasoned approach looks not at the bank's obligation to pay its
cashier's check and avoid liability as drawer or acceptor but at whether the
bank has a good defense to payment. This focusing on the bank's defenses to
liability as opposed to its obligations to pay is supported when compared to a
bank giving cash in exchange for a personal check and the payee has not
changed his position. Because a bank could recover the cash it has paid under
mistake of fact, a bank should be entitled to refuse payment on its own
cashier's check issued under the same circumstances.
Courts have followed various approaches in determining a bank's ability to
stop payment on cashier's check. The Oklahoma Court of Appeals in the
New Covenant and Yukon cases held as a matter of law that a cashier's
check is accepted when issued and, thus, any stop payment comes too late. In
so holding, the court apparently ignored the UCC as enacted in Oklahoma, "
as well as the many cases allowing a bank to stop payment for fraud and
failure of consideration.
The New Covenant court reaches its result by focusing on the wrong
issues. The question that faces courts dealing with stop payment of a
cashier's check is not whether a bank has the authority to stop payment on
the cashier's check, but whether a bank has a good defense to payment. The
validity of such defenses are governed by the UCC. The approach taken by
the New Covenant court entirely fails to even recognize the issue.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Maryland v. Garrison-Plugging a Hole
Left by Leon.
The exclusionary rule has been under attack since it was initiated. In the
words of one constitutional scholar: "Fifteen to twenty years ago, it was
thought that a criminal should go free only if the constable really [messed]
up, instead of just blundering. Today, that's what it's come down to: if
rights are violated, they really have to violate them [before the criminal goes
free."'' In recent years, the rule has lost its bite, tooth by tooth. One of the
more recent examples of this deterioration is Maryland v. Garrison.2 There,
the Supreme Court held that a search warrant that described a place to be
searched more broadly than necessary because of a policeman's mistake of
fact is not invalid under the fourth amendment as long as the mistake was
reasonable.
17. U.C.C. §§ 3-305 and 3-306 deal with claims and defenses that are good against a holder
in due course and a non-holder in due course, respectively.
18. 12A Ot<LA. STAT. §§ 1-101 through 11-107 (1981).
1. Address by Yale Kamisar, "Will the Landmark Due Process Cases of the Warren Court
Survive the Rehnquist Court?, University of Oklahoma Law School Enrichment Series (Mar. 26,
1987) [hereinafter Kamisar Address].




In Garrison police obtained a warrant to search "the premises known as
2036 Park Avenue third floor apartment." ' 3 Police claimed their investigation
indicated that the entire floor was one single apartment, when in fact the
floor was divided into two apartments. This belief resulted in police officers
uncovering contraband in Garrison's apartment, which was not the apart-
ment the police were supposed to be searching. Shortly after the contraband
was found, the police officers discovered their mistake and discontinued the
search.
Speaking for a 6-3 majority, Justice Stevens said the requirement that a
warrant must "particularly describe" the place to be searched must be
judged "in light of the information available to [the officers] at the time they
acted."' 4 Noting that the validity of the warrant must be assessed on the basis
of information the officers should disclose to the magistrate, the Court
agreed with the lower Maryland courts that "the warrant, insofar as it
authorized a search that turned out to be ambiguous in scope, was valid
when it issued." 5
Turning to the validity of the warrant and the scope of its execution, the
Court noted that "[w]hile the purposes justifying a police search strictly limit
the permissible extent of the search, the Court has also recognized the need
to allow some latitude for honest mistakes that are made by officers in the
dangerous and difficult process of making arrests and executing search war-
rants." 6 The Court turned for guidance to Hill v. California,7 which con-
cerned the validity of an arrest of a man named Miller based on the mistaken
belief that he was Hill. Probable cause to arrest Hill existed, and Miller was
in Hill's apartment. The Court said that the underlying rationale of Hill, that
an officer's reasonable mistake did not invalidate a valid arrest, "is equally
applicable to an officer's reasonable failure to appreciate that a valid war-
rant described too broadly the premises to be searched." 8 The key is
reasonableness, Justice Stevens said, and here the facts available to the of-
ficers at the time suggested they were in the right place. 9
The exclusionary rule has been in effect in federal cases since Weeks v.
United States" and was applied to the states in Mapp v. Ohio." Without
such a rule, the fourth amendment would be only "a form of words,
valueless and undeserving of mention in a perpetual character of inestimable
human liberties."' 2 The rule's major thrust was deterrence of police miscon-
duct. 3
3. Id. at 1015.
4. Id. at 1017.
5. Id. at 1018.
6. Id.
7. 401 U.S. 797 (1971).
8. Garrison, 107 S. Ct. at 1019.
9. Id.
10. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
11. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
12. Id. at 655.
13. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
1
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Since Weeks, the rule has come under constant attack. It was downgraded
from one declared to be "part and parcel" of the fourth amendment 4 to a
"judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights
generally through its deterrent effect." 5
The significance of this is obvious. One cannot easily create exceptions to
constitutional mandates; however, judicially created remedies, especially
generally unpopular ones, are easily circumvented. This is demonstrated in
United States v. Leon," where the Court upheld evidence uncovered by a
facially valid warrant whose affidavit was later shown to lack probable
cause. The Court reasoned that to exclude the evidence would not further the
causes of ihe exclusionary rule: deterring police misconduct. The Court,
balancing the costs and benefits of applying the exclusionary rule, held that a
long as the officers' reliance on the warrant was "objectively reasonable,"
excluding the evidence as a sanction for improper police conduct was inap-
propriate.' Although the source of dispute in Leon and Garrison was an in-
accurate warrant, it was generally thought that fourth amendment violations
concerning the execution of a warrant are unaffected by Leon. This is in-
dicated by the majority's caution that its discussion "assumes, of course,
that the officers properly executed the warrant and searched only those
places for those objects that it was reasonable were covered by the
warrant."' 8 Garrison plugs that hole.
Taking the teeth out of the exclusionary rule raises many concerns. The
rule is not complicated: if the search violates a person's rights the evidence is
inadmissible. The problem lies not with the rule, but with those who unsuc-
cessfully attempt to bend the rule without breaking it. Allowing good faith
exceptions merely encourages attempts to further bend the rule. In the words
of Professor Kamisar, police "still don't know what they can do. All ques-
tions would remain unanswered, and no one would care [about the fourth
amendmenti anymore, because the evidence will come in anyhow." 9 Balanc-
ing costs against benefits becomes more difficult because one balances easily
apparent costs (the grinning dope peddler walking out) against the more in-
tangible principles of the Bill of Rights. 20 Reasonableness by the officer is no
solution, as was made clear by Justice Blackmum's dissent in Garrison. The
better solution would be the one offered by Professor Kamisar: "If the




As a practical matter, prosecutors arguing for admissibility of the evidence
in similar situations would be well advised to argue that the officers were act-
14. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 651.
15. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
16. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
17. Id. at 926.
18. Id. at 918 n. 19.






ing in good faith. Defense attorneys, on the other hand, should argue that
the principles behind the rule are not furthered by admitting the evidence.
Appeals courts agreeing with defendants will, of course, base their decisions
on the state constitution, making certain that the opinion contains a plain
statement that the decision rests on adequate and independent state grounds.
2 3
that the decision rests on adequate and independent state grounds.23
INDIAN LANDS: Bingo in Indian Country-A Matter of Tribal Con-
cern
Bingo is now an acceptable method by which Indians on Indian lands may
meet the federal government's goal of tribal self-sufficiency and economic
independence of tribal members.' In California v. Cabazon Band of Mission
Indians,2 the Indians were conducting bingo games open to the public on
reservation lands. California and Riverside County sought to apply to the
tribes a state statute and a local ordinance governing the operation of bingo
games. The games were open to the public and played predominantly by non-
Indians. The games were a major source of employment for tribal members,
and the profits were the tribe's sole source of income.
These games of chance now have the stamp of approval of the United
States Supreme Court, at least in states where all gambling is not prohibited
by criminal statutes.' The Court held that where a state seeks to enforce a
law within an Indian reservation under the authority of Public Law 83-280
22. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1042 (1983).
1. See Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1542 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); In-
dian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-450n (1982 &
Supp. III 1985).
2. 55 U.S.L.W. 4225 (U.S. Feb. 25, 1987).
3. The Court indicates that because California had other state-sanctioned gambling, control
over Indian lands must be regulatory, rather than criminal or prohibitionary, in nature. Id. at
4227.
4. Codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (1982), which provides in pertinent part:
Each of the States ... listed in the following table shall have jurisdiction over of-
fenses committed by or against Indians in the areas of Indian country listed ... to
the extent that such State ... has jurisdiction over offenses committed elsewhere
within the State . . ., and the criminal laws of such State . . . shall have the same
force and effect within such Indian country as they have elsewhere within the
State.
The Organized Crime Control Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1982), provides in pertinent part:
(a) Whoever conducts, finances, manages, supervises, directs, or owns all or
part of an illegal gambling business shall be fined not more than $20,000 or im-
prisoned not more than five years, or both.
(b) As used in this section-
(1) "illegal gambling business" means a gambling business which-
(i) is a violation of the law of a State or political subdivision in which it is con-
ducted,
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and that law is regulatory in nature rather than prohibitionary, the state
authority has been preempted by operation of federal law.
This ruling has special significance for Oklahoma and its Indian popula-
tion. In 1985 the state of Oklahoma sought injunctions against the Quapaw
and Seneca-Cayuga tribes' operation of bingo games in Indian country. After
the tribes prevailed in the trial court, the two cases were consolidated on
appeal. The Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled in State v. Seneca-Cayuga
Tribe S that state regulation of bingo games conducted in Indian country was
permissible to the extent that the activity affected non-Indians and Indians
who are nonmembers of the self-governing unit.
Justice Opala, writing for the court, found the distinction between
"regulatory" and "prohibitionary" state laws unpersuasive as applied to
bingo.' Under the analysis in Cabazon, Oklahoma's regulation of bingo
games would undoubtedly be considered regulatory because not all gambling
is prohibited by state law.7 This leads to the inevitable conclusion that
Oklahoma statutory regulation of bingo games on Indian lands is preempted
by federal law.
The impact of California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians on states
such as Oklahoma who have Indian territory within their boundaries may be
significant where all gambling is not strictly prohibited. Sovereign Indian
governments now have the opportunity to use a natural resource-tribal
lands-for gambling operations, free of state regulation, which might well
ensure economic independence both for ruling bodies and members of their
respective tribes.
PLEADING: Stating a Compulsory Counterclaim in a
Separate Action*
Section 2013(A) of title 12, Oklahoma Statutes, which is the same as
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a), provides that a claim which arises out
of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's
claim is a compulsory counterclaim that must be asserted in the pending ac-
tion. If the counterclaim is not asserted and a judgment on the merits is
(ii) involves five or more persons who conduct, finance, manage, supervise,
direct, or own all or part of such business, and
(iii) has teen or reamins in substantially continuous operation for a period in
excess of thirty days or has a gross revenue of $2,000 in any single day.
5. 711 P.2d 77 (Okla. 1985).
6. Id. at 90.
7. State staiutes regulating bingo are found at 21 OKLA. STAT. §§ 995.1, 995.12, 995.10
(1981 & Supp. 1986). In addition, parimutual betting is now permitted under Oklahoma law.
SEe 3A OKLA. STAT. § 205.6 (Supp. 1986).
* This recent development should be considered with the article Fraser, Counterclaims,





rendered in the pending action, the counterclaim is barred; it cannot be
asserted in a subsequent action.'
The United States Supreme Court has stated that Federal Rule 13(a) "was
designed to prevent multiplicity of actions and to achieve resolution in a
single law suit of all disputes arising out of common matters." 2 Therefore, to
hold that a counterclaim, which arose out of the transaction or occurrence
that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim, could be asserted
subsequently would frustrate the purpose of the federal rule. For the same
reason, to avoid the inconvenience and expense to the parties, the court, and
the witnesses, the federal courts hold that a claim and a counterclaim that
arise out of the same transaction or occurrence should not be litigated in dif-
ferent courts. 3 If both claims are litigated concurrently, the first judgment
that is rendered may be asserted as res judicata in the other action."
Where a claim is asserted in a federal court and another claim that should
have been asserted as a compulsory counterclaim under Federal Rule 13(a) is
asserted in another court (federal, state, or foreign), the first action filed
should be litigated absent a showing of the balance of convenience in favor
of litigating the subsequent action, or a showing of any special circumstances
in favor of the second action.- Therefore, the party who objects to the
maintenance of the second action should seek to have it dismissed or stayed
until the first action is disposed of.
6
Staying the second action is more appropriate than dismissing it so that the
second action can be litigated if the first action fails other than on its merits.'
1. Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc., 417 U.S. 467, 469 n.1 (1974). See 6 C. WRIGHT& A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1417 (1971); Fraser, Counterclaims, Cross-Claims
and Third-Party Claims Under the Oklahoma Pleading Code, 39 OKLA. L. REv. 1, 1-4 (1986).
2. Southern Constr. Co. v. United States for the Use of Pickard, 371 U.S. 57, 60 (1962).
3. Seattle Totems Hockey Club, Inc. v. National Hockey League, 652 F.2d 852, 856 (9th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub nom. Northwest Sports Enters., Ltd. v. Seattle Totems Hockey
Club, 457 U.S. 1105 (1982). See 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 1, § 1416; Annotation,
Effect of Filing As Separate Federal Action Claim That Would Be Compulsory Counterclaim In
Pending Federal Action, 81 A.L.R. Fed. 240 (1987).
4. See Carter v. Bedford, 420 F. Supp. 927 (W.D. Ark. 1976); Nolen v. Hammet Co., 56
F.R.D. 361 (D.S.C. 1972).
5. Columbia Plaza Corp. v. Security Nat'l Bank, 525 F.2d 620, 626 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Rem-
ington Products Corp. v. American Aerovap, Inc., 192 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1951). In SW Indus.,
Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 653 F. Supp. 631 (D.R.I. 1987), the court considered the conveni-
ence of the parties and the witnesses, the availability and custody of documents, and the appli-
cable state law. The plaintiff in the second action argued that the forum selected by an insured
should be selected over the forum selected by an insurer and that a damage action should be
selected over an action for declaratory relief; but the court rejected both arguments. In addition,
the court found that neither action would be more comprehensive than the other; in either, the
court could hear all issues and could obtain jurisdiction over all interested persons.
6. Donnkenny, Inc. v. Nadler, 544 F. Supp. 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (stayed); White Motor
Corp. v. International Union, 365 F. Supp. 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (stayed), aff'd on other
grounds, 491 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1974); E.J. Korvette Co. v. Parker Pen Co., 17 F.R.D. 267
(S.D.N.Y. 1955) (dismissed).
7. Leonard F. Fellman Co. v. Smith-Corona Merchant, Inc., 27 F.R.D. 263 (E.D. Pa.
1961).
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If the second action is brought in another federal court, the second court
may transfer the action to the court where the first action is pending so that
the two actions may be consolidated.' However, a transfer is not possible
where the second action is brought in a state court or the court of a foreign
country.
Where the second action is brought in another federal court, 9 or the court
of a foreign country, 10 and the second court does not dismiss, stay, or trans-
fer its action, the federal court where the first action is pending can enjoin
the prosecution of the second action." If, however, the second action is
asserted in a state court, the federal court is prohibited by the Anti-
Injunction Statute 2 from enjoining the second action.' 3
[Federal] Rule 13(a) has been held not to create an express
Statutory exception to the proscriptions of § 2283 and, accord-
ingly, a federal court is barred by § 2283 from enjoining a party
from prozeeding in state court on a claim that should have been
pleaded as a compulsory counterclaim in a prior federal suit. 4
Therefore, the federal and the state actions may proceed concurrently.
Although generally only the first suit should be litigated, at times justice
would be served if the second action were litigated instead of the first."'
Then, the second court should refuse to stay or dismiss its action, although
8. Columbia Plaza Corp. v. Security Nat'l Bank, 525 F.2d 620, 629 n.65 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
See Pumpelly v. Cook, 106 F.R.D. 238, 81 A.L.R. Fed. 233 (D.D.C. 1985), for a discussion of
the options available to the second federal court.
9. Warshawsky & Co. v. Arcata Nat'l Corp., 552 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1977); National
Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Fowler, 287 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1961). The Fowler case states that the first
court cannot order the second court to transfer the case pending before it to the first court. Id.
at 46-47. That the second action was removed from a state court does not prevent the first court
from enjoining its prosecution where the action cannot be remanded. Columbia Plaza Corp. v.
Security Nat'l Bank, 525 F.2d 620, 629 n.64 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Accord Roth v. Bank of the Com-
monwealth, 583 F.2d 527, 536 n.5 (6th Cir. 1978).
10. Seattle Totems Hockey Club, Inc. v. National Hockey League, 652 F.2d 852 (9th Cir.
1981), cert. denied sub nom. Northwest Sports Enters., Ltd. v. Seattle Totems Hockey Club, 457
U.S. 1105 (1982).
11. Such injunctions should be granted sparingly. United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d 1025,
1038 (2d Cir. 1985). Also, generally the party objecting to the maintenance of the second action
should seek relief in the second court before asking for an injunction from the first court. Exxon
Corp. v. United States, 655 F.2d 1112, 1116 n.5 (Emer. Ct. App. 1981).
12. 28 U.S.C. j 2283 (1982).
13. See Carter v. Bedford, 420 F. Supp. 927 (W.D. Ark. 1976); Nolen v. Hammet Co., 56
F.R.D. 361 (D.S.C. 1972). See also Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226 (1922) (decided be-
fore the Federal Rules were adopted). Contra Comprehensive Health Sys., Inc. v. Chamberlain,
648 F. Supp. 247 (D. Utah 1986) (federal court "stayed" a state action).
14. Seattle Totem Hockey Club, Inc. v. National Hockey League, 652 F.2d 852, 855 n.5 (9th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub nom. Northwest Sports Enters., Ltd. v. Seattle Totems Hockey
Club, 457 U.S. 1105 (1982).
15. Mattel, [nc v. Louis Marx & Co., 353 F.2d 421, 424 n.4 (2d Cir. 1965); Comprehensive
Health Sys., Inc. v. Chamberlain, 648 F. Supp. 247 (D. Utah 1986).
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this may result in the controversy being litigated in two separate actions.' 6 To
avoid this undesirable result, the first court may stay or dismiss its claim.'
7
Or, if both actions are brought in federal courts, the first court may transfer
the original action to the second court so that the claims may be consolidated
for trial.' 8 In at least one case the second court enjoined the first court from
proceeding with the original claim.' 9
Since section 2013(A) of the Oklahoma Pleading Code is the same as
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a), the Oklahoma courts should follow
the federal cases where a claim that should be asserted as a compulsory
counterclaim in a pending action is asserted in a separate action. 20 Therefore,
ordinarily the court in which the counterclaim is brought, whether it is
another Oklahoma court, a federal court, a court of another state, or a court
of a foreign country, should generally stay or dismiss the action.
However, the second court cannot transfer the second claim to the
Oklahoma court where the original action is pending. Even if the second ac-
tion is brought in another Oklahoma court, it cannot be transferred to the
first court because Oklahoma does not have a statute that authorizes actions
to be transferred in the furtherance of justice.2' If the second action is
brought in another Oklahoma court, a court of another state, or a court of a
foreign country, ordinarily the court where the first action is brought can en-
join the prosecution of the second action. However, if the second action is
brought in a federal court, the Oklahoma court cannot enjoin its prosecu-
tion." In exceptional situations, in the interest of justice, it may be desirable
for the second court to hear both claims. Then, the first court should either
stay or dismiss the first action, although a stay would be more appropriate
than a dismissal.
16. American Fidelity Fire Ins. Co. v. Construcciones Werl, Inc., 70 F.R.D. 695 (D.V.I.
1976). See Mayacamas Corp. v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 806 F.2d 928 (9th Cir. 1986)
(refusal to stay or dismiss not appealable).
17. For a discussion of the problem of staying a federal action where a compulsory
counterclaim is not involved, see Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460
U.S. 1 (1983).
18. Blessing v. Norman, 646 F. Supp. 82 (N.D. Ga. 1986); Polaroid Corp. v. Casselman, 213
F. Supp. 379 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). Either court may transfer its claim to the other court. Columbia
Plaza Corp. v. Security Nat'l Bank, 525 F.2d 620, 627 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
19. Sentry Corp. v. Conal Int'l Corp., 164 F. Supp. 770 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
20. Knox v. McMillan, 272 P.2d 1040 (Okla. 1954).
21. The federal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1982), provides that "for the convenience of
parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to
any other district or division where it might have been brought."
22. Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408 (1964).
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